# 4.3 Remote Attestation and Sybil Resistance Protocol

#### Node Registration

Each node must submit:

* Measured boot attestation (TPM / secure enclave hash)
* Manufacturer-issued device certificate
* Firmware hash committed on-chain

Invalid attestation results in registration denial and task ineligibility.

#### Sybil Resistance

Each node is bound to a unique hardware identity via PUF or manufacturer certificate.

* One-time registration per device enforced on-chain
* Simulated or cloned devices fail attestation verification against manufacturer CA public keys

#### Continuous Integrity Monitoring

Nodes must re-attest at each epoch (initially every 24 hours; adjustable via governance).

* Failure → quarantine state (no task assignment, collateral at risk)
* Firmware modification → immediate slashing and certificate revocation


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